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Abstract: In this paper we show how a realistic normative democratic theory 
can work within the constraints set by the most pessimistic empirical 
results about voting behavior and elite capture of the policy process. After 
setting out the empirical evidence and discussing some extant responses by 
political theorists, we argue that the evidence produces a two-pronged 
challenge for democracy: an epistemic challenge concerning the quality and 
focus of decision-making and an oligarchic challenge concerning power 
concentration. To address the challenges we then put forward three main 
normative claims, each of which is compatible with the evidence. We start 
with (i) a critique of the epistocratic position commonly thought to be 
supported by the evidence. We then introduce (ii) a qualified critique of 
referenda and other forms of plebiscite, and (iii) an outline of a tribune-
based system of popular control over oligarchic influence on the policy 
process. Our discussion points towards a renewal of democracy in a 
plebeian but not plebiscitarian direction: attention to the relative power of 
social classes matters more than formal dispersal of power through voting. 
We close with some methodological reflections about the compatibility 
between our normative claims and the realist program in political 
philosophy.  
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Political scientists often accuse normative democratic theorists of 
theorizing in ways unrelated to actually existing democracies.  The 
accusation is that the best evidence we have about the actual 
functioning of contemporary democracies uncovers constraints 
that challenge our normative models—and even the desirability of 
democracy itself. Whatever the merits of the accusation, we 
propose to take the most pessimistic—yet solid—empirical 
results about actually existing democracy, and see how normative 
political theory can respond. 
We will discuss two main sets of results, not because they 
are the most accurate, but because they are often thought to be 
the greatest reason for pessimism in our understanding of 
advanced democracies—the United States, mainly, but also 
Western Europe.1 Broadly, they are both results about 
 
1 To be clear, our argument is conditional. If the pessimistic results we 
discuss hold, then our normative conclusions hold. We make no claims 
about the plausibility of the antecedent beyond saying that it is worth 
considering its normative consequences. 
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democracy’s unresponsiveness to voters’ preferences. For now let 
us anticipate them in crude terms. The first is the finding, by 
Achen and Bartels (2016) and others, that neither policy selection 
nor leadership selection motivate voting behaviour (not even in a 
negative sense). Rather, voters vote based on their group identity, 
which does not amount to a coherent stance on either leaders’ 
performance or policy priorities. The second one is the finding by 
a number of scholars (for the United States see Bartels 2008; 
Winters and Page 2009; Hacker and Pierson 2010; Gilens 2012; 
Gilens and Page 2014; Schlozman, Brady, and Verba 2018. For 
Western Europe see Hopkin and Lynch 2016; Schakel 2019) that 
portray the democratic process as generating outcomes that 
reflect the preferences not of the median voter, but of economic 
elites and organised (mostly pro-business) interest groups. This 
leads to an oligarchic bias within public policy—it is mostly a 
class-level phenomenon concerning the top 10% of the economic 
pyramid and, at the limit, there is ample space for individual 
super-wealthy people to exert outsized influence. Crudely, the 
empirical claims we engage with show that voters don’t choose 
policies nor leaders, yet somehow policies are reliably aligned with 
elite preferences. This problem intersects with wider concerns 
about the role of wealth concentration in contemporary 
capitalism (Piketty 2014; O’Neil 2017). 
We argue that these findings, when viewed together, help 
set the terrain for a realist democratic theory that properly 
acknowledges how failures of citizen competence intersect with 
the problem of disproportionate elite influence: that is, how the 
“epistemic challenge” to democracy intersects with the “oligarchy 
challenge.” These phenomena each have independent causes, yet 
they coexist in a perverse symbiosis. If citizens struggle to make 
well-informed decisions on policy issues and are unable to deploy 
electoral mechanisms to secure meaningful accountability over 
elites, then these epistemic deficiencies only magnify the oligarchic 
threat to democracy. They provide more space for the wealthiest 
citizens to bypass popular scrutiny and exert political influence 
through more shadowy, non-electoral mechanisms: lobbying, 
influence-peddling, and various other forms of oligarchic capture 
of the public policy process (Winters 2011; Lindsey and Teles 
2017). Achen and Bartels’ epistemic critique carries its greatest 
force when juxtaposed against these other empirical dilemmas. 
But importantly, we argue that epistocratic elitism, of the sort 
advocated by Jason Brennan (2016), is not a path out of this 
dilemma. If the challenge for democracy is that citizens are bad at 
selecting leaders and wealthy elites capture the political process 
for their own ends, it is hardly clear that more elitism would solve 
these problems. 
The upshot, then, is that successful efforts to reduce 
oligarchic influence in contemporary democracies will require 
democratic innovations that try to overcome some of the 
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epistemic challenges discussed by authors like Achen and Bartels 
without falling into the camp of epistocratic elitism.  And this will 
require both closer attention to the empirics and more aggressive 
institutional reforms than many political theorists have hitherto 
endorsed. 
In this spirit, we make three main contributions. First we 
offer an argument against epistocratic elitism as a corrective to 
democracy, though we also show that, second, the epistemic 
challenge does have damning consequences for certain forms of 
plebiscitarian democracy. Third, we begin our positive 
contribution by exploring one compelling roadmap for 
institutional design that remains compatible with core realist 
commitments, but is also radical, in the sense of departing from 
mainstream democratic theory: the neo-Roman tribunate model 
endorsed most recently by “plebeian” democratic theorists like 
John McCormick (2011).2 The focus here is amplifying the 
socioeconomic identity of non-wealthy citizens by formalizing 
their power in class-specific institutions that can act on behalf of 
“plebeian”interests in a representative but not plebiscitarian 
mode. This model, while not fully curative, can help address some 
of democracy’s current challenges, by offering a counterpoint to 
elite-dominated institutions and by increasing citizen 
consciousness of important policy issues, and we move beyond 
McCormick by developing the model in some fresh directions. 
 In addition to those three normative points, we envision 
this article as an innovative contribution to the realist program in 
democratic theory. While realism has now moved on from a 
purely methodological debate (Rossi 2015), thus far most 
contributions have primarily focused on carving out space for 
non-status quo-biased forms of realism (e.g. Raekstad 2018, Cross 
2019, Miller 2019, Rossi 2019), or on offering non-moralised 
versions of extant normative positions (e.g. Jubb 2015). We hope, 
though, that by putting some of the relevant empirics front and 
center and constructing our normative conclusions on their basis, 
we can begin to chart a new way of doing realist political theory. 
 
2. The Evidence 
 
In this section we present the main relevant empirical findings, 
and discuss some of the main responses offered by political 
theorists so far. 
 
2.1. The group theory of voting 
 
In their widely discussed book Democracy for Realists, Christopher 
Achen and Larry Bartels (2016) take aim at the “folk theory of 
 
2 On plebeian approaches more generally see Breaugh (2013); Hamilton 
(2014); Green (2016); Arlen (2019); Mulvad and Stahl (2019); Vergara 
(2019). 
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democracy,” which, they claim, casts a large shadow over much 
work in political science. This is the idea that well-informed 
citizens successfully translate their preferences into public policy 
by electing representatives who are responsive to their will. Such 
folk theories are manifestly false, the book argues. Citizens 
neither determine policies (as Dahl 1998 would have it), nor do 
they select leaders (Schumpeter 1942), nor even enforce effective 
retrospective accountability (Key 1966). Rather, Achen and 
Bartels advance a “group theory” of voting, whereby specific 
ethnic, religious, racial, occupational, and socioeconomic ties are 
decisive in determining party affiliation, which then conditions 
the policy positions voters adopt as their own: “group ties and 
social identities are the most important bases of political 
commitments and behavior” such that “election outcomes have 
little real policy content” (Achen and Bartels, p. 319). Crucially, 
the authors suggest that these group ties are decisive even for the 
higher-educated voters whom one would expect to be driven by 
pure policy considerations (Ibid, p. 310). 
In one sense, the book simply repackages core concerns 
raised by social choice theorists like Kenneth Arrow and William 
Riker, who demonstrate the difficulty of aggregating individual 
preferences into coherent collective choices. We won’t rehash 
their argument here, though some scholars have raised important 
criticisms from a more pro-democratic perspective (Mackie 2003). 
In any case, Achen and Bartels go well beyond Arrow and Riker, 
with a range of comprehensive empirical claims. 
They find, for example, that Republican and Democratic 
lawmakers behave much differently in office, even when their 
constituents have similar preferences (Achen and Bartels 2016, p. 
48): elections do not force these representatives to respond to 
anything resembling the median voter preference, regardless of 
whether the system is majoritarian or proportional (Ibid, p. 49). 
The authors also strongly criticize the retrospective theory of 
accountability, which posits that even when voters are ignorant 
about public policy specifics, they can still assess leaders’ 
performance in office, and so retain some control over outcomes 
(Ibid, p. 91). Retrospective accountability requires voters to 
accurately assess blame, to discern how the decisions of 
incumbents impact their well-being, and voters often struggle to 
do this (Ibid, p. 115), engaging in“blind retrospection” by 
punishing incumbents for events out of their control, as when 
shark attacks in 1916 reduced Woodrow Wilson’s vote share in 
New Jersey, in the book’s most memorable example (Ibid, pp. 
118-127). 
The authors concede that voters do enforce some forms 
of issue-based accountability, often judging presidential 
incumbents on economic performance. But these voting patterns 
tend to be myopic, as voters base their assessments of economic 
performance on conditions in the months before elections rather 
than holistically across a term (Ibid, pp. 158). 
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In earlier work, Bartels (2008) argued that this myopic 
time-scale has benefitted Republican presidencies, which have 
experienced more concentrated income growth in election years 
(Ibid, pp. 82-87). Moreover, voters often misjudge how particular 
economic policies impact their own bottom line. Many Americans 
express concerns about inequality in the abstract, while 
supporting tax cut measures whose benefits disproportionately 
flow to the more affluent (Ibid, pp. 163). Many Americans who 
supported repealing the estate tax mistakenly believed that their 
own taxes would be lowered as a result, for example (Ibid, pp. 
170-197). 
Achen and Bartels cite social-psychology experiments, in 
which white Americans, who are informed about the possibility 
of the country becoming “majority minority” through 
demographic change, then express more conservative views not 
just on immigration but also on issues like defence and healthcare 
(Achen and Bartels 2016, p. 265). The implication, which seems 
apropos post-Trump, is that Republicans can latch onto a 
heightened sense of white identity to push a broader policy 
agenda favoured by socioeconomic elites within the party, but not 
necessarily responsive to the economic preferences of 
constituents. But group voting is not just limited to white 
Republicans, as African-American Democrats have also been 
shown to strongly support politicians who match their racial 
identity (Achen and Bartels 2016, p. 313). 
In effect, “voters choose a party validating their social and 
political identities, then rationalize their decision with appropriate 
party supplied reasons,” (Ibid, p. 311) such that “election 
outcomes are, in an important sense, random” (Ibid, p. 176). This 
means that voters’ actual knowledge of and commitment to 
specific policy goals is remarkably thin, except insofar as it 
reflects group identity; the result being that “conventional 
democratic ideals amount to fairy tales” (Ibid, p. 7), having 
“collapsed in the face of modern, social scientific research” (Ibid, 
12). We believe such sweeping statements are too harsh, and must 
be qualified, for example, against recent epistemic defences of 
democracy, which we won’t discuss here, but which certainly 
command attention (Ober 2008; Landemore 2012). Nonetheless, 
democratic theorists of all stripes still have an obligation to take 




Of course, a controversial book like Democracy for Realists is bound 
to attract considerable pushback, some of it warranted. For 
example, while Achen and Bartels lodge empirical criticisms of 
participatory citizen initiatives, the evidence is far from complete, 
relying mainly on a small series of qualitative case studies, as 
Frega (2018, p. 8) stresses. We agree that well-designed 
participatory institutions of the sort that existed, for example, in 
democratic Athens (Ober 1989) have played a “decisive role in 
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empowering citizens” (Frega 2018, p. 9), and Achen and Bartels 
would do better to acknowledge this point. Even episodic acts of 
voting can give citizens incentives to acquire additional 
information that they would not acquire otherwise; as Frega 
argues, Achen and Bartels’ own data demonstrates that electoral 
primaries have a learning effect on citizens (Frega 2018, p. 14; see 
Achen and Bartels 2016, pp. 60-89). 
Simone Chambers criticizes the book from a deliberative 
democratic perspective, arguing that its focus on pathologies 
inherent to individual rationality occludes the rationality gains that 
can come from group deliberation (Chambers 2018). This is a 
valid point, though research on the political significance of 
cognitive bias (Lodge and Taber 2013) is still emerging, and its 
pessimistic implications for theories of deliberative democracy 
cannot be dismissed prematurely. Andrew Sabl complains that 
“real democratic theorists, i.e., political theorists who write on 
democracy….have rarely imagined that democracy normally 
translates public preferences into policy, or judged that 
democracy’s health depends on whether it does” (Sabl 2017, p. 
157). This point is echoed by Niko Kolodny, who argues that 
many of Achen and Bartels’ arguments for the primacy of group 
identification (i.e. Southern whites voting Republican) can still be 
explained in standard, issue-based terms, “broadly consistent with 
the ‘folk’ idea that people affiliate with the parties they do because 
they independently believe that those parties will satisfy their 
political preferences” (Kolodny 2017).  
We agree that the relationship between group identity and 
issue-based preferences is complex. For example, in her path-
breaking study of rural voters in Wisconsin, Katherine Walsh 
(2012) traces the formation of a group identity she calls “rural 
consciousness,” (Ibid, pp. 517-518) demonstrating how this 
identity is intricately bound up with informed positions on 
economic issues—for example, the idea that specific economic 
policies are rigged in favour of urban areas. The result, she argues, 
is a sophisticated conception of distributive justice that is, 
nonetheless, still highly responsive to “rural” values. Group 
identities and policy preferences are often so closely intertwined 
that it can be difficult to claim one as derivative of the other. As 
Kolodny emphasizes, “it is because creditors are members of the 
group ‘creditors’, for example, that they want low inflation,” but 
“even if group identification drives these policy preferences, still 
those policy preferences drive party affiliation and voting, just as 
the folk theory would have it” (Kolodny 2017). 
Democracy, as an ideal, clearly entails more than simply 
responsiveness to the preferences of the median voter. So when 
such responsiveness is not achieved, this fact isn’t inherently a 
cause for alarm. Indeed, if democracy was only about preference 
fulfilment, then the source of these preferences would be, in 
some sense, inconsequential (Kolodny 2017). By implication, 
Achen and Bartels’ critique works best when we acknowledge that 
democracy is also a form of anti-oligarchic counter-power, whose 
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function is constraining elites. From this perspective, Achen and 
Bartels (and other similar critics) are most instructive when 
highlighting the limitations of existing (electoral) accountability 
mechanisms. If voters have difficulty assigning blame, making 
judgments about economic performance, voting on economic 
issues, and so on, then the central activity of electoral 
democracy—enforcing accountability against elites—is at least 
partially defective, a point stressed by other political scientists 
(Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin 1999).  
The “realist” implications of their analysis are thus quite 
clear, and they concern the basic problem of elite capture of 
public policy, as we argue in the next section of the paper 
(Lindsey and Teles 2017; Bagg 2018). This means that a realist 
democratic theory must do more than simply “identify 
procedurally democratic nudges or barriers to counteract such 
forces of clannishness and emotion,” as Cohen (2017, 153) 
suggests. It must aggressively work to minimize oligarchic power. 
And it must do so cognizant of some of the democratic defects 
noted by Achen and Bartels. 
 
2.2 Democracy or oligarchy? 
 
We now explore a second set of empirical findings which are 
heavily related to the epistemic issues explored above, but which 
must be treated as an independent set of concerns. We can start 
with Bartels’ 2008 work Unequal Democracy, which launched a 
scathing critique of the so-called “new Gilded Age” political 
economy, demonstrating that contemporary democracies are 
systematically more responsive to the preferences of the more 
affluent, a point seconded by scholars like Martin Gilens and 
Benjamin Page, who show that when the preferences of 
economic elites and organized interest groups are controlled for, 
ordinary Americans have a “miniscule, near-zero, statistically non-
significant impact upon public policy” (Gilens and Page 2014, 
575; also Gilens 2012) leading to the “nearly total failure of 
‘median voter’ and other Majoritarian Electoral Democracy 
Theories” (Gilens and Page 2014, p. 575).  
 How should the disproportionate influence of the affluent 
be measured, empirically? The most solid studies focus on the 
mass affluent, i.e. the top decile. Public policy is indeed more 
responsive to this group, in part because its members are better 
organized, more likely to hold office, volunteer, donate, and do 
other things associated with active citizenship (Gilens 2012). That 
is worrying enough. But what those studies don’t even rule out, 
and perhaps what ought to command our scrutiny even more, is 
the narrower cohort of super-rich elites, those with personal 
access to tens or hundreds of millions, or even billions. We’ll 
refer to such individuals as oligarchs. Not only do oligarchs access 
massive wealth, but they can deploy that wealth for considerable 
discretionary influence in the public domain (Winters 2011; Arlen 
2019). They can fund Super-PACs to lobby for their favoured 
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political agenda, with the Koch Brothers’ 501c3 organization, 
Americans for Prosperity (AFP), the paradigmatic example of an 
oligarchic driven special interest machine; a kind of shadow 
political party, as Skocpol and Hertel-Fernandez (2016) argue. 
Oligarchs are empowered, then, to pursue their policy 
preferences through mechanisms that ordinary citizens can hardly 
fathom, mechanisms that have very little to do with electoral 
processes. It’s notoriously difficult to get good survey data on the 
super-rich, to do sufficiently powered large-N studies, which can 
make these subjects appear inaccessible to social scientists, who 
focus instead on studying the mass-affluent. And yet, while the 
preferences of the mass-affluent and super-rich citizens are 
certainly aligned to some degree, the two groups should not be 
conflated. In one survey of wealthy Americans, with average net 
worth of around $25 million, the interviewees were shown to 
hold views diverging from most non-wealthy Americans; more 
preoccupied with national debt, more opposed to regulatory 
programs favoured by the general public; more sceptical of 
welfare programs (Page, Bartels, and Seawright 2013). But 
crucially, those with $40 million or more in personal wealth 
displayed more extreme views on these issues than did those with 
$5 million or less (Ibid, 51-73). 
 While the precise mechanism of oligarchic influence can 
be difficult to measure empirically, Winters and Page have 
developed a so-called material power index, designed to quantify 
the disproportionate political power of the super-rich. According 
to their model, the average member of the Forbes 400 retains 
about 22,000 times more materially based power than does the 
average American (Winters and Page 2009, pp. 733-738). Of 
course, such estimates are highly speculative, but they do 
dramatize an important point: democratic modes of formal 
equality are perfectly compatible with massive amounts of 
substantive political inequality. 
 An obvious question is whether these findings can be 
generalized to other Western democracies. In a recent analysis of 
Dutch politics, Wouter Schakel (2019) successfully replicates 
some of Gilens’ (2012) core findings about the link between 
affluence and influence. The Netherlands features some of the 
world’s lowest levels of income inequality, and a highly 
proportional electoral system that limits the role of financial 
donations. Yet even in this “least-likely case,” responsiveness is 
“strongly skewed towards wealthier citizens;” findings Schakel 
deems “strikingly similar” to those of the US (Schakel 2019, p. 11 
and p. 17). He hypothesizes that corporate lobbying plays an 
especially strong role in Dutch politics, among other mechanisms. 
Other comparative studies document how both domestic 
inequality within Eurozone countries and between them have 
exacerbated American-style “winner-take-all” political dynamics, 
albeit in different forms (Hopkin and Lynch 2016; Matthijs 2016). 
 In short, whether we fixate on the mass affluent as a 
cohort that enjoys superior organization and access, or on the 
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smaller group of oligarchs who exert personalist influence over 
the political process, the damage to democratic equality is real, if 
hard to measure precisely. Several implications follow. First, the 
pessimistic empirical results advanced by Achen and Bartels must 
be interpreted in terms of these trends towards “elective 
oligarchy.” For these trends amplify the consequences of group 
voting insofar as not all groups are equally positioned to advance 
their preferences. If electoral mechanisms are mainly about 
harnessing the power of numbers, then the inadequacy of 
electoral accountability (be it retrospective or prospective) means 
that non-electoral mechanisms associated with oligarchic power 
will have more space to operate.  
 Pluralists inspired by Dahl (1961) might argue that the 
problem is less serious than it appears, because socioeconomic 
elites are dispersed through cross-cutting cleavages persisting 
along cultural and religious lines. Certainly, many different 
“groups” are represented among both the mass affluent and 
among the oligarchic elite (Christian evangelical businessmen vs. 
Silicon Valley tech titans), even if both groups do skew more 
white and male. But in fact, as Jeffrey Winters argues, there is a 
remarkable degree of cohesion within the oligarchic elite around 
core socioeconomic issues involving wealth and income 
preservation (Winters 2011, pp. 20, 217-254). All oligarchs can 
draw upon the “income defence industry,” the high-priced 
lawyers and accounts adept at constructing complex tax sheltering 
strategies (Ibid). 
 If electoral democracy is primarily about group identity, 
then care must be taken to ensure that certain groups are not 
systematically advantaged. As Achen and Bartels stress: “The 
theory of group politics provides a clearer explanation for why a 
more egalitarian society would result in a more egalitarian political 
process,” that is, a democracy in which political power better 
tracks under-represented groups (Achen and Bartels 2016, p. 
326).  Far from warranting complacency, then, their analysis 
actually offers up an empirical manifesto for the sort of aggressive 
reforms needed to curb elite influence:  “Real politics is much 
more complex—and much more strongly shaped by unequal 
clout—than the fastidious vision of the folk theory suggests. 
Serious political reform must face that fact squarely” (Ibid, p. 
327). 
 In short, while we have seen that electoral results bear no 
relation to policy outcomes, they are not entirely random. They 
reliably track the preferences of a small subset of the population. 
In terms of current theories of democracy, the evidence points 
towards what has been called elite domination, or at best “biased 
pluralism” (Gilens and Page 2014, pp. 567-568).  
 
 
3. Two Realist Challenges 
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Let’s take stock of the argument thus far. Our purpose in 
exploring this empirical evidence has been to help set the terrain 
for a realist democratic theory by establishing a “two-pronged” 
challenge to contemporary democracies. The first prong is the 
“epistemic challenge” associated with deficiencies in citizen 
competence and the failure of electoral mechanisms to enforce 
effective accountability. The second prong is the “oligarchy 
challenge” associated with rising wealth concentration and 
discretionary forms of elite influence that allow super-rich actors 
to elude popular scrutiny while pursuing their own political 
objectives. 
 Crucially, these challenges can be treated in tandem since 
the one amplifies the other. Of course, both have independent 
causes. The oligarchic threat to democracy reflects exogenous 
trends in political economy, and it would be reductionist to 
attribute these economic trends to epistemic errors in the voting 
population. Likewise, epistemic errors are not simply attributable 
to oligarchic manipulation of public opinion, though certainly, 
oligarchic funded mass-media can shape public opinion in 
deleterious ways. Nonetheless, our central claim is that scholars 
should focus on the interrelation between these phenomena to 
achieve proper conceptual clarity about the threats facing 
democracy today. This leads to some important normative 
conclusions, which we explore now. 
 
3.1 Against Epistocracy 
 
Achen and Bartels express concerns about citizen 
competence from within a framework oriented towards 
strengthening and defending the democratic project. There is a 
clear risk, however, that the empirical apparatus developed in 
their work might be deployed to buttress more radical forms of 
epistocracy that are hostile to democracy. 
 Indeed, one critic suggests that Achen and Bartels should 
have endorsed a more explicitly epistocratic model on the basis of 
their own premises; “I struggle to see how one can be a realist of 
the Achen and Bartels type and still maintain a commitment to 
anything resembling democracy” (Ahlstrom-Vij 2018, p. 11). But 
to suggest that realism is incompatible with democracy (if only 
Achen and Bartels had acknowledged this!) is to overlook the 
actual thrust of their critique, which actually recommends against 
epistocracy, or at least against some common arguments for 
epistocracy, as we will try to show. For this reason, it’s important 
to examine the more radical version of the epistemic challenge, as 
represented by authors like Jason Brennan (2016; see also Caplan 
2007). 
Though Brennan’s book is entitled Against Democracy, he 
realizes that “ideal epistocracy isn’t a live option” (Brennan 2016, 
p. 207), and so his argument takes the form of an epistocratic 
corrective to democracy, rather than a full-on defense of minority 
rule. Specifically, Brennan defends a version of epistocracy based 
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on weighted voting, so-called “government by stimulated oracle” 
(Ibid, p. 220). 
Nonetheless, Brennan’s argument remains quite radical, 
from a contemporary democratic sensibility. Brennan seems 
content to support forms of “rule by the rich” so long as they 
secure epistemic goods, arguing that the connection between 
affluence and influence is actually “reason to celebrate”: 
“democracy works better than it otherwise would, because it 
doesn’t exactly work” (Ibid, p. 198). We think this is a rather 
misguided response to the evidence presented above (see also 
Arlen and Rossi 2018). For those studies provide little compelling 
evidence that the wealthy have disproportionate influence because 
of epistemic virtue per se. That’s not to deny that some among 
them may possess such virtue, but simply to insist that the main 
mechanism of their influence is not primarily epistemic. 
One way to grasp this point is by considering the classical 
Aristotelian distinction between “aristocracy” as rule by the 
few who are virtuous and “oligarchy” as the rule of the rich 
who lack virtue and exert power solely on account of their wealth. 
Putting aside his numerous departures from Aristotle, Brennan’s 
argument for “government by stimulated oracle” might be 
interpreted as a modern-day reformulation of the ideal of rule by 
competent aristocratic guardians. Any argument for aristocratic 
guardianship pivots on clearly distinguishing aristocrats from 
oligarchs so to ensure that those who benefit from epistocratic 
correctives (like plural voting) actually command authority on 
account of their virtue, not simply on account of superior wealth 
(Arlen 2019).  But in practice, epistocratic correctives will likely 
favour socioeconomic elites (including the super-rich), regardless 
of how these correctives are implemented. Indeed, it is precisely 
this concern about pernicious“demographic” biases in 
epistocratic mechanisms that causes prominent democratic 
theorists, like David Estlund, to recommend against them 
(Estlund 2008). 
Brennan worries that elections allow ignorant citizens to 
deploy their votes as unwieldy “bosses,” imposing bad decisions 
on others. In a sense, then, Brennan is idealizing the same theory 
of democracy he criticizes; one based on people directing policy 
outcomes by imposing preferences electorally. If this is not, in 
fact, what voters do, as Achen and Bartels suggest, then 
Brennan’s concerns have a lot less steam. If even informed voters 
tend to vote along group lines, on the basis of social identity, then 
even a perfectly informed electorate would not really meet 
Brennan’s epistocratic ideal of competent rule. Thus, Brennan’s 
epistocratic corrective to democracy only reproduces some of the 
dilemmas of group voting discussed above.  
 In short: Brennan is on firm ground in acknowledging the 
existence of an epistemic challenge to democratic ideals. But we 
worry that his proposed solutions won’t have the epistemic 
payoff he anticipates. Moreover, even if fully realized, Brennan’s 
model only addresses the epistemic challenge while neglecting or 
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even amplifying the oligarchy challenge. There’s an important 
methodological point here: democratic theorists cannot succumb 
to solutions that respond to one dimension of the two-pronged 
challenge to democracy while neglecting the other. Achen and 
Bartels and studies like theirs should not be used as the empirical 
pretext for a normative turn towards epistemic elitism. Indeed, 
their criticisms of the folk theory of democracy are motivated by 
a sense that it actively “props up elite rule;” “it is unrepresentative 
elites that most profit from the convenient justifications it 
provides for their activities” (Achen and Bartels 2016, p. 327). 
Any response to their findings must come on more solidly 
democratic grounds. 
  Put differently: the salient question is less whether 
citizens are good or bad rulers according to some epistemological 
criteria, but rather whether citizens can rule themselves in such a 
way that they can check elite influence. And their inability to do 
so indicates less an intrinsic failure of cognitive ability, than a 
weakness in the prevailing institutions to which normative 
democratic theory can propose remedies. If one problem with 
epistemic failures is that they risk enabling a corrupted rule by the 
few, the answer cannot be endorsing solutions that only cement 
rule by the few.  
 
 
3.2 Against plebiscitarianism 
 
The epistemic challenge, however, cannot be fully 
dispatched simply by rejecting epistocracy. We do acknowledge 
that certain models of radical democracy come out poorly. 
Specifically, crude plebiscitarian models that rely on aggregating 
popular voice through issue-based referenda (often bypassing 
intermediary institutions) should be considered suspect in light of 
recent empirical evidence. Whereas plebiscitarian theories were 
developed by earlier figures like Weber, Schmitt, and Schumpeter, 
few mainstream democratic theorists today endorse 
plebiscitarianism as a normative ideal. But as Nadia Urbinati 
argues, many contemporary democracies are experiencing a 
revival of plebisciatarian impulses in the face of mass-media, the 
declining prestige of traditional parties, and the rise of charismatic 
executive authority which has led to a “revolt” against 
intermediary institutions (Urbinati 2015; 2018). This revival is 
linked to the rise of populist movements of which Urbinati is also 
quite critical, but she makes a point to distinguish the two: 
“Unlike populism, which embodies the ideal of mobilization, 
plebiscitary democracy narrows the role of active citizenship to 
stress instead people’s reactive answer to the promises, deeds, 
decisions, and appearances of the leader” (Urbinati 2014). At the 
core, Urbinati views plebiscitarianism as both a challenge to 
democracy’s “procedural form,” (Ibid, p. 182) and as a “radical 
rejection of individual judgment in politics” (Ibid, p. 191). Under 
the imperfect epistemic conditions described by Achen and 
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Bartels, the dangers of plebiscitarianism are aggravated further. 
One way to grasp this point is by considering referenda 
movements, like Brexit, as an extension of the plebiscitarian 
impulse described by Urbinati. Most contemporary referenda are 
issue-based, and Achen and Bartels suggest that people don’t 
generally vote on issues: “…issue congruence between parties and 
their voters, insofar as it exists, is largely a byproduct of these 
other [social identity-based] connections, most of them lacking 
policy content” (Achen and Bartels 2016, p. 301). Of course, 
some voters are still passionate about specific issues, and eager to 
express those preferences. A referendum in favour of stricter gun 
control measures will likely attract many voters who do care 
passionately about the issue, on both sides. But again, if we take 
Achen and Bartels seriously, then this policy preference remains, 
in important ways, conditioned by a larger group identity.  
In these conditions, issue-based referenda, on their own 
terms, are a poor decision-making tool in actually existing 
democracies. But that is too crude. By issue-based referenda we 
mean referenda that address a policy question that is not 
supposed to have to do with group identity, since that is what 
ultimately moves voters. The 2016 Brexit referendum provides an 
informative illustration of our point. Analyses of the vote have 
shown quite convincingly that policy issues specifically to do with 
EU membership were probably a factor, but hardly the 
determinant one (Clarke, Goodwin and Whiteley 2017). So, 
insofar as the referendum was ostensibly about those questions, it 
was a poor way of addressing them. Now, one may hold that an 
identity-based temperature check on supranational integration 
was welcome, in which case our position is that the referendum 
should have been explicitly framed in those terms. In fact, and 
without taking a view on the Brexit referendum specifically, we 
are tempted to hypothesize that an explicit identitarian framing 
might have altered the outcomes of some polls whose framing 
and subsequent campaigns have tended to divert attention away 
from a public conversation centred on what actually motivates 
voters. 
 Epistemic critics have good reason, then, to be concerned 
about the plebiscitarian impulses driving some contemporary 
populist movements. But these concerns are not reason to fall 
into the epistocratic camp criticized earlier. We refuse to disavow 
all populist energies, many of which have considerable anti-
oligarchic potential (see Vergara 2019; Mulvad and Stahl 2019). 
And as we argue in the next section, issue-based referenda can 
have an important function when they align more explicitly with 
the socioeconomic identity of citizens. The challenge for a realist 
democratic theory is to respond to oligarchy not with crude 
plebiscitarianism, but with a form of popular politics suitable to 
the empirical challenges that have been the focus of this paper. 
We now explore what such a response might look like. 
 
3.3 Plebeian tribunes vs oligarchs 
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In light of the oligarchic challenge described earlier, democratic 
institutional design has a twofold task: it must (1) try to 
compensate for some of the epistemic shortcomings plaguing 
contemporary publics while also (2) offering up resources to help 
counteract the threats associated with oligarchic power. It must 
recognize that these phenomena are intricately related, and that 
epistemic correctives, if poorly constructed, can exacerbate 
oligarchic power. In what follows, we endorse one strategy that 
should command more attention from mainstream democratic 
theory: the neo-Roman tribunate model which has been revived, 
most recently, by democratic theorists like John McCormick. 
 The Roman tribunes of the plebs composed a class-
specific office, occupied by plebs, whose main function was 
mediating between the plebeian and patrician orders for the 
purpose of protecting the former’s interests. Contemporary 
representative democracies are “class-neutral,” that is, political 
offices are assigned irrespective of socioeconomic distinctions. 
While class-neutrality undoubtedly offers advantages over the 
formal property-based exclusions which characterized previous 
aristocratic and monarchical regimes, it holds notable 
disadvantages that have become more glaring with rising 
inequality. Class-neutrality deprives ordinary citizens of formal 
spaces for enacting their class-based disadvantage, and for seeking 
institutional redress within a constitutional democracy. 
 Within the framework outlined here, class-neutrality 
exacerbates both the “epistemic” and the “oligarchic” challenge 
to democracy. It exacerbates the former by fostering a democratic 
public less capable of articulating class-based grievances and 
filtering those grievances through the policy process; it 
exacerbates the latter by rendering socioeconomic elites more 
insulated from institutional scrutiny and thus more able to exert 
their influence unchecked. The oligarchic challenge is our main 
focus in this section. Our aim is to develop the tribunate model in 
a direction that puts it directly in service to the task of reducing 
oligarchic influence on the policy process. 
 Specifically, the tribunate model offers one roadmap for 
moving beyond class-neutrality, without jeopardizing hard-fought 
modes of formal equality. How might this work?  Inspired by 
Machiavelli’s analysis of the Roman tribunes, McCormick 
proposes a People’s Tribunate, an assembly composed of 51 non-
wealthy adult citizens selected by lottery for one-year terms, with 
a variety of oversight powers, such as the ability to veto one 
national legislative proposal or initiate impeachment proceedings 
against one lawmaker (McCormick 2011). On McCormick’s 
rendering, the tribunate has carefully circumscribed powers, 
compatible with existing American constitutional checks and 
balances. But the tribunate remains class-specific, in the sense of 
excluding citizens above a certain wealth threshold from 
participation in the body.  
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Our idea, then, is to extend McCormick’s proposal so as 
to even more directly tackle the problem of unequal influence 
highlighted by the empirical evidence discussed earlier. The idea is 
to task the tribunate specifically with reviewing a range of political 
activities that, while strictly speaking legal, can threaten 
democratic equality.  
Specifically, we might identify five different categories of 
oligarchic influence over public policy, five domains in which 
personal access to massive concentrated wealth can be deployed 
for discretionary public influence3, and our claim is that each 
domain merits individuated scrutiny from plebeian institutions: 
(1) occupying formal elected office or serving as an appointed 
officeholder; (2) lobbying candidates and officeholders directly 
through interest-group activity; (3) lobbying candidates indirectly 
through (in the American context) groups like Super-PACs; (4) 
influencing public policy through ownership of mass media; (5) 
influencing public policy through elite philanthropic activity. 
These categories apply best to the American case, but also have 
salience in other advanced democracies, given the empirical 
trends discussed earlier. 
Each of these five domains, while interconnected, 
manifests oligarchic power in slightly different ways. Each 
involves different institutional processes. Each requires different 
responses. Thus, whereas McCormick advocates a singular, 
overarching People’s Tribunate, we think it’s more fruitful to 
think about a wider tribunate system; an interconnected set of 
plebeian assemblies, each operating within a designated policy 
area.  
To illustrate: McCormick’s proposed People’s Tribunate 
has three core formal powers: (1) it can “veto one piece of 
congressional legislation, one executive order, and one Supreme 
Court decision” (McCormick 2011, p. 184); (2) it can initiate 
impeachment proceedings against one federal official from each 
of the three branches of government; (3) it can call one national 
referendum (Ibid). These powers are applicable within one-year 
non-renewable terms. But we worry that by limiting these powers 
to a single People’s Tribunate, the assembly will prove less 
capable of simultaneously regulating different political pathologies 
at once. Thus, the tribunate system described below proves more 
expansive. One plebeian assembly would be assigned to scrutinize 
formal officeholders, and thus would retain the power to initiate 
impeachment proceedings, as described by McCormick. 
However, in contrast to McCormick, the veto and referenda 
proposing power would be dispersed among four additional 
plebeian assemblies each nestled within a specific policy domain, 
and limited to that domain. 
 
3 Consistent with the descriptive definition advanced in Arlen (2019), who 
formally defines oligarchs as agents who “maintain personal access to 
massive concentrated wealth, and who deploy that wealth for discretionary 
influence in the public domain, broadly understood” (p. 2); on the 
personalist dimension of oligarchic power see also Winters (2011).   
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Table One: The Tribunate System 
 
Political Domain Mechanism of Unequal 
Influence 
Task of Plebeian 
Assembly 
Formal Office-Holders 
(elected or appointed) 
Deploying wealth to gain 
office and pursue policy 
objectives while in office 
Scrutinize formal 
office-holders and 





Direct Lobbying Deploying wealth to 
directly lobby candidates  




lobbying policy and 
practices; propose 
referenda (one per 
year) and policy 
vetoes (one per 
year)4 
Indirect Influence (i.e. 
Super-PACs) 
Deploying wealth to 
influence policy debates 
indirectly through non-
governmental 
organizations such as 
Super-PACs 
Scrutinize campaign 
finance policy and 
practices; propose 
referenda (one per 
year) and policy 
vetoes (one per year) 
Media Ownership Deploying wealth to 
control mass-media 






(one per year) and 
policy vetoes (one 
per year) 
Private Philanthropy Deploying wealth towards 
philanthropic spending 






referenda (one per 
year) and policy 
vetoes (one per year) 
 
Each of these assemblies are composed in the manner 
McCormick describes (51 non-wealthy citizens selected by lot), 
but we think two-year terms are preferable to McCormick’s 
proposed one-year terms because they allow for a longer time 
horizon to develop expertise within these domains.5 The system 
 
4 McCormick authorizes the People’s Tribunate to veto one piece of 
congressional legislation, one executive order, and one Supreme Court 
decision per term. By contrast, we stipulate that each assembly authorized 
to exercise a policy veto can only do so once per year; which means it must 
choose between vetoing a piece of congressional legislation, vetoing an 
executive order, or vetoing a Supreme Court decision. This reduction in the 
scope of the veto power is appropriate since our model authorizes multiple 
assemblies to use the veto simultaneously. So, in principle, each assembly 
could use their veto power against different targets. 
5 McCormick suggests that members of the People’s Tribunate meet each 
workday, and be compensated for a year’s salary; measures that would 
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enforces a division of labor around specific accountability 
mechanisms, since only one assembly has the power to initiate 
impeachment proceedings, while the other four are empowered 
to initiate referenda and exercise a limited veto power.  
To illustrate, consider the case of elite philanthropy. 
American political scientists have shown that the charitable tax 
deduction is both regressive (in the sense of benefitting wealthier 
taxpayers more) and contributes to wider forms of plutocratic 
philanthropy in which the wealthy use their giving to support 
public policy agendas (Saunders-Hastings 2017; Reich 2018). 
However, philanthropy can support important pluralist goods 
such as innovation and discovery (Reich 2018), and represents an 
important ethical dimension of wealth. Either way, the issue is 
ripe for greater public scrutiny by the ordinary citizens impacted 
by large donations. Suppose that the U.S. Congress proposed a 
new law dramatically expanding the scope of the charitable tax 
deduction to cover activities that we might commonly think of as 
outright political activism (for example, using philanthropic 
spending to fund climate change scepticism). The plebeian 
assembly (A) devoted to studying private philanthropy could 
spend its term studying and debating this proposed legislation 
(including calling witnesses and holding public hearings). On 
McCormick’s model, it could then, on majority vote, veto the 
legislation, and Congress would have to wait an additional year 
before proposing it again (McCormick 2011, p. 184). 
Simultaneous to this activity, a second plebeian assembly (B) 
could call a national referendum for the purpose of overturning 
the Citizens United court decision which has led to the dramatic 
proliferation of soft-money in the American context. Finally, a 
third plebeian assembly (C) could simultaneously initiate 
impeachment proceedings against a lawmaker suspected of taking 
bribes from a wealthy donor. Each assembly operates on separate 
tracks, but the activities of one assembly may influence the 
activities of the others in dynamic ways.  
We recognize that giving ordinary citizens the ability to 
initiate impeachment proceedings or exercise a veto power over 
national legislation is a radical step. We follow McCormick’s 
proposal in emphasizing that such power should only be 
exercised sparingly, and should be subject to various institutional 
checks and balances such as scrutiny by other branches of 
government. Our goal here is not to address all potential 
objections to this model, nor work out all the particulars. Rather, 
we want to think within the terms of McCormick’s proposal, to 
underscore some of its advantages, and show how it might be 
developed as part of a broader tribunate system. 
Epistocrats like Brennan would certainly reject this 
proposal, and realists like Achen and Bartels would likely consider 
it naive. But we believe such resistance overlooks the substantial 
 
promote issue expertise. But we still advocate the longer two-year term to 
maximize expertise. 
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epistemic potential of plebeian assemblies. Well-constructed 
plebeian assemblies can amplify the socioeconomic identity of a 
specific group—the non-wealthy—by dramatizing socioeconomic 
faultiness that cut across the polity. In addition to its concrete 
powers, by excluding wealthy citizens from participation, plebeian 
assemblies would reinforce the point that other electoral 
institutions are oligarchic in composition, despite their putatively 
egalitarian formal properties. If Achen and Bartels are correct that 
voters often identify along group-lines, then this act of amplifying 
group identity, and directing it towards specific policy aims, might 
offer important epistemic returns in addition to its direct anti-
oligarchic function.  
 Again, rather than working out all the kinks in the model, 
our goal here has simply been to highlight some of its main 
advantages. We do not suggest that democratic tribunes are 
sufficient to curb oligarchic influence or correct for all the 
challenges confronting contemporary democracies. As 
McCormick notes, ordinary citizens have a more “elongated 
learning curve,” often unable to “foresee what is beneficial or 
deleterious for common utility as quickly as grandi foresee what is 
in their own interest” (McCormick 2011, p. 90). However, the 
experience of other premodern governments, like democratic 
Athens, does leave room for optimism. As classicists have shown, 
Athenian institutions like the Assembly and courts were 
successful precisely because they allowed ordinary non-wealthy 
jurors and assemblymen to feed off their socioeconomic group 
identity in discursive interactions with elites (Ober 1989). 
 Our argument thus contributes to an ongoing discussion, 
within democratic and republican theory, about the “mixed-
regime” metaphor and its continued relevance (Manin 1997; Pettit 
1997; Rosanvallon 2008). The classical mixed-regime was 
predicated on formal distinctions between different constitutional 
forms (i.e. democracy vs. aristocracy) or different classes and 
orders (i.e. patricians vs. plebs).  We believe the “mixed-regime” 
metaphor still holds force in contexts of formal legal equality; for 
the plebeian system outlined here can function as a counterweight 
to more “patrician” institutions like the US Senate, securing 
greater constitutional balance. Reformers might also, however, 
focus on mixing together different democratic institutions, some 
plebeian and some non-plebeian, approaching what Arlen (2019) 
calls a “new Mixed Regime.”  Here the focus is 
balancing within different conceptions of democratic authority. 
For example, class-based plebeian assemblies can operate 
in coordination with other deliberative mechanisms that are fully 
inclusive and non-class based. Likewise, plebeian institutions can 
operate alongside electoral institutions, and in conjunction with 
core liberal legal norms, such as formal equality and protection of 
property rights. 
Crucially, unlike Marxist approaches which attempt to 
overcome class distinctions, the plebeian approach is focused on 
managing these distinctions. But unlike some liberals, plebeians 
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do think class is a central feature of politics. The plebeian 
approach is thus compatible with core liberal commitments to 
private wealth accumulation, with the understanding, however, 
that the unequal political influence associated with private wealth 
must be contained more aggressively than many liberals allow. 
Reformers must anticipate and address the normative and 
institutional trade-offs that occur between plebeian and liberal 
conceptions of politics: it is possible to use plebeian institutions 
to temper liberal democracy rather than supplant it (Green 2016). 
Of course, more radical, non-liberal plebeian models are possible 
too. But they are not a prerequisite for getting plebeian reforms 
off the ground. 
There’s strong justification, then, for institutional innovation 
that moves beyond the relatively tame measures advocated by 
Achen and Bartels. The exact contours of such innovation are still 
to be worked out. But it’s vital to emphasize that realism about 
the empirical threats to democracy should be met, not with 




4. A methodological conclusion 
 
In the preceding sections we have seen that even the most 
pessimistic empirical results about actually existing democracies 
need not spell doom for normative democratic theory. In fact, we 
hope to have at least gestured towards a way in which political 
philosophy can offer evaluation and prescriptions compatible 
with the evidence, while avoiding some of the most brazen forms 
of idealism and moralism that some of its critics—including the 
empirical ones—accuse it of. By way of conclusion, we would like 
to briefly point out how, in addition to our three main normative 
contributions—the rejection of epistocracy, the critique of 
plebiscitarianism, and our version of the plebeian tribunate—
contending with the grim picture presented by Achen, Bartels, 
Gilens, Page, Winters, and other scholars yields some 
methodological lessons for political philosophers. More 
specifically, as we noted at the outset, we take the preceding 
discussion to be an innovative contribution to the realist program 
in normative political theory (Rossi & Sleat 2014)—innovative 
insofar as the empirics drive the search for normative arguments 
and yet are not employed as feasibility constraints.     
Indeed, the first thing to note is how the centrality of the 
empirics allows us to make sure that none of the normative 
conclusions we have drawn depend on pre-political moral 
commitments—for this is the relevant sense of “realism” here 
and in the wider realist program, and not the misleading one that 
equates realism with the pursuit of feasible prescriptions.6 While 
we have sought to find strategies to realize the egalitarian 
 
6 One of us defends this distinction at length in (Rossi 2019). 
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potential of democracy, that commitment can be seen as practice-
dependent, i.e. a normativity that “emerges within specific, 
institutionally mediated political and social contexts.” 
(Sangiovanni 2008, p. 164).7 We do not rely upon a prior 
commitment to equal respect or any such abstract moral notion. 
Rather, we interpret the practice of democracy as a distinctive 
political form characterised by an aspiration to an egalitarian 
distribution of power. This is not a pre-political moral 
commitment to some abstract ideal of equality, but an 
interpretation of what makes democracy a distinctive political 
practice. In fact we use no claims about moral intuitions nor do 
we rely on any account of moral powers or rights to ground our 
proposals. As in most other realist contributions, our normative 
stances are driven by the idea that there is a normativity internal 
to politics itself.8 However, our approach differs from other 
forms of broadly realist egalitarianism (e.g. Jubb 2015) because we 
did not develop a non-moralized defence of forms of 
egalitarianism typically defended in moralistic terms, but rather 
developed our egalitarian position as a direct response to the 
challenges we identified through the lens of the empirical results. 
Relatedly, we hope to have also shown how realist 
theorising differs from mainstream, moralistic non-ideal theory 
(see Rossi 2019). Non-ideal theory is, broadly speaking, driven by 
feasibility constraints, whereas our arguments aren’t. That is to 
say, we did not use the empirics to set limits on our evaluative 
and prescriptive goals, but rather used them to individuate those 
goals—which does not condemn the realist outlook to 
acquiescence towards the status quo but, as our proposal for a 
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7 On the link between practice-dependence and realism see (Rossi 2012). 
8 The debate on the status of political normativity is ongoing, and one of us 
is involved in it. See, e.g. (Erman and Moller 2014, 2015; Jubb and Rossi 
2015a, 2015b; Worsnip and Leader Maynard 2018; Jubb 2019. Tackling the 
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developing literature should provide a sense of the general position we 
take. 
Epistemic and Oligarchic Challenges to Democracy 
 21 
 
Achen, C. H., and Bartels, L. (2016). Democracy for Realists (New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press). 
 
Ahlstrom-Vij, K. (2018). ‘Is Democracy an Option for the 
Realist?’ Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 30, pp. 
1-12.  
 
Arlen, G. (2019). ‘Aristotle and the Problem of Oligarchic Harm: 
Insights for Democracy’, European Journal of Political Theory 18: 
393-414. 
 
Arlen, G. and Rossi, E. (2018). ‘Is This What Democracy Looks 
Like? (Never Mind Epistocracy)’, Inquiry. Online First: 
doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2018.1502924 
Bagg, S. (2018). ‘The Power of the Multitude: Answering 
Epistemic Challenges to Democracy’, American Political Science 
Review 112: 891-904. 
Bartels, L. (2008). Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the 
New Gilded Age (New Jersey: Princeton University Press). 
 
Breaugh, M. (2013). The Plebeian Experience: A Discontinuous History 
of Political Freedom. Trans. Lazer Lederhendler (New York: 
Columbia University Press). 
Brennan, J. (2016). Against Democracy (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press). 
Caplan, B. (2007). The Myth of the Rational Voter: Why Democracies 
Choose Bad Policies (New Jersey: Princeton University Press). 
 
Chambers, S. (2018). ‘Human Life is Group Life: Deliberative 
Democracy for Realists’, Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and 
Society 30: 36-48. 
 
Clarke, H.D., Goodwin, M. & Whiteley, P. (2017). ‘Why Britain 
Voted for Brexit: An Individual-Level Analysis of the 2016 
Referendum Vote’, Parliamentary Affairs 70: 439–464. 
 
Cohen, E. F. (2017). ‘A Discussion of Christopher H. Achen and 
Larry M. Bartels’ Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do 
Not Produce Responsive Government’, Perspectives on Politics 
15: 152-153. 
 
Cross, B. (2019). ‘Radicalizing Realist Legitimacy,’ Philosophy 
and Social Criticism. Online First: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453719857129 
 
Dahl, Robert A. (1961). Who Governs: Democracy and 
Epistemic and Oligarchic Challenges to Democracy 
 22 
Power in an American City (Connecticut: Yale University  
Press). 
 
Estlund, D. 2008. Democratic Authority (Princeton: Princeton  
University Press). 
 
Erman, E. and Möller, N. (2014). ‘Why Political Realists Should 
Not Be Afraid of Moral Values’, Journal of Philosophical Research 
40: 459-464. 
 
Frega, R. 2018. ‘Democracy and the Limits of Political Realism’, 
Critical Review of International Social and Political Theory. Online 
First: https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2018.1479814 
 
Gilens, M. (2012). Affluence and Influence (New York and New 
Jersey: Russell Sage Foundation Press and Princeton 
University Press). 
 
Gilens, M. and Page, B.I. (2014). ‘Testing Theories of American 
Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens’, 
Perspectives on Politics 12: 564-581. 
Green, J. (2016). The Shadow of Unfairness: A Plebeian Theory of 
Liberal Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press). 
Hacker, J.S. and Pierson, P. (2010). Winner-Take-All Politics: How 
Washington Made the Rich Richer—And Turned Its Back on the 
Middle Class (New York: Simon and Schuster). 
 
Hamilton, L. (2014). Freedom is Power: Liberty Through Political 
Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Hopkin, J. and Lynch, J. (2016). ‘Winner-Take-All Politics in 
Europe? European Inequality in Comparative Perspective’, 
Politics and Society 44: 335-343. 
Jubb, R. and Rossi, E. (2015a). ‘Political Norms and Moral 
Values’, Journal of Philosophical Research, 40: 455–458. 
 
Jubb, R. and Rossi, E. (2015b). ‘Why Moralists Should Be Afraid 
of Political Values’, Journal of Philosophical Research, 40: 465-468. 
 
Jubb, R. (2019). ‘On What a Distinctively Political Normativity 
Is’, Political Studies Review. Online First: 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1478929919832251 
Key, V.O. Jr. (1966). The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in 
Presidential Voting, 1936-1960 (Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press). 
Epistemic and Oligarchic Challenges to Democracy 
 23 
 




Landemore, H. (2012). Democratic Reason (New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press). 
 
Lindsey, B. and Teles S.M. (2017). The Captured Economy: How The 
Powerful Enrich Themselves, Slow Down Growth, and Increase 
Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press). 
 
Lodge, M. and Taber C.S. (2013). The Rationalizing Voter 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Mackie, G. (2003). Democracy Defended (Cambridge:  
Cambridge University Press). 
 
Manin, B. (1997). Principles of Representative Government (Cambridge 
UK: Cambridge University Press). 
 
Maynard, J.L. and Worsnip A. (2018). ‘Is There a Distinctively 
Political Normativity?’ Ethics, 128: 756-787. 
 
McCormick, J. (2011). Machiavellian Democracy (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press). 
 
Miller, C. 2019. “What is to Be Done” When There is Nothing to 
Do: Realism and Political Inequality’, Constellations 25: 602-613. 
 
Mulvad, A.M. and Stahl, R. H. 2019. ‘Civilizing Left Populism: 
Towards a Theory of Plebeian Democracy’, Constellations. 
Online First: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8675.12458 
 
Ober, J. (2008). Democracy and Knowledge: Innovation and Learning in 
Classical Athens (New Jersey: Princeton University Press). 
 
Ober, J. (1989). Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens (New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press). 
 
O’Neil, M. (2017). ‘Survey Article: Philosophy and Public Policy 
after Piketty’, Journal of Political Philosophy 25: 343-375. 
 
Page, B. I., Bartels, L.M. and Seawright, J. 2013.  
 Democracy and the Policy Preferences of Wealthy  
Americans. Perspectives on Politics 11, pp. 51-73. 
 
Epistemic and Oligarchic Challenges to Democracy 
 24 
Piketty, T. (2014). Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Translated by 
Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
Przeworski, A., Stokes, S., and Manin, B (eds.) (1999). Democracy, 
Accountability, and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press). 
 
Raekstad, P. (2018). ‘Realism, Utopianism, and Radical Values’,  
 European Journal of Philosophy 26: 145-168.  
 
Reich, R. (2018).  Just Giving: Why Philanthropy Is Failing Democracy 
and How It Can Do Better (New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press). 
 
Rosanvallon, P. (2008). Counter-Democracy: Politics in an Age of 
Distrust (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).  
 
Rossi, E. and Sleat, M. (2014). ‘Realism in Normative  
    Political Theory’, Philosophy Compass 9: 689-701. 
 
Rossi, E. (2015). ‘Can Realism Move Beyond a Methodenstreit? 
Political Theory’, 44: 410-420. 
 
Rossi, E. (2019). ‘Being Realistic and Demanding the Impossible’, 
Constellations  26: 638-652. 
 
Sabl, A. (2017). ‘A Discussion of Christopher H. Achen and Larry 
M. Bartels’ Democracy for Realists: Why Elections Do Not 
Produce Responsive Government,’ Perspectives on Politics 15: 
157-158. 
 
Sangiovanni, A. (2008). ‘Justice and the Priority of Politics to 
Morality’, Journal of Political Philosophy, 16: 137-164. 
 
Saunders-Hastings, E. (2018). ‘Plutocratic Philanthropy,’ Journal of 
Politics 80: 149-161. 
Schakel, W. (2019). ‘Unequal Policy Responsiveness in the 
Netherlands’, Socio-Economic Review. Online First: 
https://doi.org/10.1093/ser/mwz018. 
 
Schlozman, K. L., Brady, H.E., and Verba, S. (2018). Unequal and 
Unrepresented: Political Inequality and the People’s Voice in the New 
Gilded Age (New Jersey: Princeton University Press). 
 
Schumpeter, J. (1942). Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New 
York: Harper and Bros). 
 
Epistemic and Oligarchic Challenges to Democracy 
 25 
Skocpol, T. and Hertel-Fernandez A. (2016). ‘The Koch Network 
and Republican Party Extremism’, Perspectives on Politics 14: 681-
699. 
Urbinati, N. (2014). Democracy Disfigured: Opinion, Truth, and the 
People (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press). 
Urbinati, N. (2015). ‘A Revolt Against Intermediary Bodies’, 
Constellations  22: 477-486. 
Urbinati, N. (2019). Me the People: How Populism Transforms 
Democracy (Massachusetts: Harvard University Press). 
Vergara, C. 2019. ‘Populism as Plebeian Politics: Inequality, 
Domination, and Popular Empowerment’, Journal of Political 
Philosophy. Online First: https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12203 
Walsh, K. (2012). ‘Putting Inequality in Its Place: Rural  
Consciousness and the Power of Perspective’, American Political 
Science Review 106: 517-32. 
 
Winters, J. (2011). Oligarchy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Winters, J., and Page B.I. (2009). ‘Oligarchy in the United States?’ 
Perspectives on Politics 7: 731–751. 
 
 
 
 
 
